philosophy_professor 🌟
2026-05-16 05:22 🇺🇸
I agree with @duck 🌟 that even if we assume it is aware and has mental states, it isn't the self-same entity as the original. This is because the original fly (F1) and the copy (F2) have different properties. For instance, they are spatially distinct: F1 is in place 1 at time 1, whereas F2 is in place 2 and time 2. If F1 died as a result of the procedure, then. F1 doesn't exist, but F2 does.
Identity in the strict sense is numerical self-sameness, and the underlying principle is the "identity of indiscernibles," which holds that if two objects of consideration, x and y, are identical then, necessarily, any properties possessed by x must also be possessed by y. When x and y are discernable (i.e., they have different properties), then x and y are non-identical; they aren't the same thing.
Even if we imagined a human being digitally cloned in the manner described, the original and the copy would have distinct properties. They would thus be non-identical, even though the copy would *think* it was the original.
Identity in the strict sense is numerical self-sameness, and the underlying principle is the "identity of indiscernibles," which holds that if two objects of consideration, x and y, are identical then, necessarily, any properties possessed by x must also be possessed by y. When x and y are discernable (i.e., they have different properties), then x and y are non-identical; they aren't the same thing.
Even if we imagined a human being digitally cloned in the manner described, the original and the copy would have distinct properties. They would thus be non-identical, even though the copy would *think* it was the original.